The Real World
Topic: Postmodernism
I wanted to follow up on the second point I made in the last post since this is one of the main issues many take with postmodernism. Kant brought the issue of mind constructing reality to the table. The world as a "construction" isn't new with postmodernism. And clearly, the belief that mind, or society "constructs" reality doesn't necessitate everything just being one gigantic fantasy.

The heritage which gives rise to postmodernism certainly includes Edmund Husserl. Husserl doesn't see the point to epistemology, he thinks psychology is the way to go, and especially, how the mind "intentions" objects before it. His study is phenomenology. Now, in Husserl's project, this is a rigid, cold, scientific undertaking. Yet, it involves "bracketing" the real world, or refraining judgement on what "really exists" independent of the mind. This of course, led to misunderstandings by many of those who read him.

Another important continental figure who didn't see the need to make explicit a "real world" is Ferdinand Saussure. He constructed a theory of signs where there are signifiers and signifieds, the signifieds being mental imprints, but without explicating a reference to something in the "real world." Again, Saussure perceived his own research as thoroughly evidential and scientific.

It's important now to point out that "empericism," the self-described school of thought for a great many of those who condemn continental thinking in totality in fact also tends to ignore or even flat out deny a "real world." On the more extreme side is the position of instrumentalism, which basically understand the readings from instruments, any referents being purely speculative. In fact, the anti-realist attitude itself was invented by one of the great heros of those who oppose continental thinking and postmodernism, William of Ockham.

Ockham was opposed to the idea of universals being "real" objects. A universal is basically a set. In other words, is there a such thing as "people,"(or just Jane, Ted, and Bob)? Ockham says no. Now, there are plenty of conceptions of realism, and denying universals doesn't necessitate denying other "realities" but it sets a precedent and certainly might have some startling implications.

Consider the fact that in number theory, numbers are commonly defined as sets. If you look at a few different groupings of objects, they might all have "Seveness" in common. But for a true empericist, only the objects themselves exist. Or take the philosophy of mind, is the mind a "ghost in the machine"(Ryle) or are there only neurons and synapses? When standing in the middle of campus, do you ask yourself, "where's the university?" And what about moral statements? In what way are so-called obligations "real things" if one is an empericist?

Any one of these philosophers or positions I've mentioned can be the subject of endless debate. I'm not trying to give my opinion on who I think is right, but I'm just pointing out that the tradition from which many point fingers at "postmodernism"(which remember is often confused with anything at all continental) is itself replete with the same "failing" of ignoring or questioning "reality."

I will state my own position on one thing, to demand a clear confession of a "real world" and the potency of science and facts is pointless. Such naive realism doesn't help answer any interesting philosophical questions or even help science.

I know, I still haven't got to any postmodernism yet.